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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of judicial estoppel, in its most generic form, pre-
vents a party from asserting a position in one legal proceeding that
directly contradicts a position taken by that same party in an earlier
proceeding.1 The precise elements necessary for the application of
judicial estoppel vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,2 but in general,
it will apply only when the two positions are clearly contradictory 3 and
when the first position has been accepted by a court.4 This doctrine is
designed to protect the integrity of the courts, not the litigants.5
Although the purpose and contours of the rule can be sketched,
it is not clear what types of legal positions, once successfully asserted,
will trigger judicial estoppel. When a litigant attempts to contradict a
prior statement of fact made under oath, the application of judicial
estoppel is easy to understand. For example, in Lowery v. Stovall, the
Fourth Circuit applied judicial estoppel to a plaintiff who claimed in a
civil action that a policeman had attacked him without provocation
after the plaintiff had already pleaded guilty and testified in criminal
proceedings to maliciously attacking another officer on the scene.6
But should judicial estoppel apply to a litigant who in one proceeding
asserts that a will provides for a residence to be held in trust, and then
later argues that the will provides for the residence to be distributed
outright?7 What about a litigant who states to one court that an ordi-
nance amounts to a tax, then argues in another that it does not?8 Or
a litigant who characterizes a particular action as in personam, then as
1 See, e.g., Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988); Patriot Cine-
mas, Inc. v. Gen. Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987); Lawrence B. Solum,
Caution! Estoppel Ahead: Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 32 Lov. L.A.
L. REv. 461, 471 (1999).
2 See Patriot Cinemas, 834 F.2d at 212; see also New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742,
750 (2001) ("Courts have observed that '[t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel
may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of
principle.'" (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982))).
3 See New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750.
4 See id.; infta Part II.
5 See New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749-50 ("Although we have not had occasion to
discuss the doctrine elaborately, other courts have uniformly recognized that its purpose is
'to protect the integrity of the judicial process .... ' (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982))); see also Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal
Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he doctrine is intended to protect the
judicial system, rather than the litigants . . ").
6 See Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 220, 224 (4th Cir. 1996). The court described
Mr. Lowery's behavior as "wanting to 'have [his] cake and eat it too,"' because by pleading
guilty, he received a greatly reduced sentence, the benefit of which he had already reaped
when he tried to repudiate his own testimony. Id. at 225 (quoting Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1177 (D.S.C. 1974)).
7 See Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1997) (answering yes).
8 See Folio v. City of Clarksburg, 134 F.3d 1211, 1218 (4th Cir. 1998) (answering no).
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quasi in rem?9 Finally, should judicial estoppel apply to a litigant who
changes positions on the question of whether a court has jurisdiction
over a particular type of claim?"' These scenarios illustrate contradic-
tory positions on matters ranging from the purely factual' to the
purely legal.12 In the middle ground are "combined questions of fact
and law"13 and a category that has variously been described as legal
positions, opinions, conclusions, assertions, theories, or contentions,1 4
in which the positions taken are ones of law applied to the specific
facts of a case. 15 With respect to inconsistent positions other than the
purely factual, the circuits are divided as to whether judicial estoppel
applies. 16
Despite the split in authority as to the application of judicial es-
toppel to inconsistent legal positions; until recently Supreme Court
9 SeeJett v. Zink, 474 F.2d 149, 154-55 (5th Cir. 1973) (answering yes). It should be
noted, however, that subject matter jurisdiction may present a different question. See Da
Silva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[Tlhe issue of subject matter
jurisdiction is one we are required to consider, even if the parties have ignored it or...
have switched sides on the issue.").
10 See United States v. Hampton Tree Farms, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 741, 747 (D. Or.
1994). In a related action, Hampton had argued that a federal district court lacked juris-
diction to review determinations made by government contracting officers, a position
Hampton did not take in the instant action. Id. The court did not apply judicial estoppel,
however, because Hampton had not been successful in asserting the earlier position, or,
alternately, because Hampton had not engaged in behavior that undermined the integrity
of the courts. See id.
11 The Supreme Court has given as examples of purely factual positions such state-
ments as, "The light was red/green," and "I can/cannot raise my arm above my head."
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 802 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
12 In the context of interrogatories, courts have defined issues of pure law as "'legal
issues unrelated to the facts of the case.'" O'Brien v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 443 F.
Supp. 1182, 1187 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (quoting FED. R Civ. P. 33(b) advisory committee note
to 1970 amend.). In O'Brien, the court considered an interrogatory that asked for the
opposing party's analysis of the applicability of a statute to a provision of the IBEW consti-
tution to be a question of pure law. Id. at 1187-88.
13 Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. Gen. Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 214 (1st Cir. 1987).
14 See, e.g., Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1997).
15 See O'Brien, 443 F. Supp. at 1187 (finding that an interrogatory seeking an explana-
tion of how the plaintiffs utterances violated his responsibilities was a "legal theory based
on the facts").
Throughout this Note, the generic phrase "legal position" refers to all positions not
purely factual. This phrase therefore includes positions of law applied to fact as well as
positions of pure law. The phrases "position of law applied to fact" and "position of pure
law" will be used to differentiate between those two categories when necessary in order to
avoid confusion.
16 See, e.g., Helfand, 105 F.3d at 535. The Ninth Circuit, in stating its position, noted
the split in authority:
[The plaintiffs] contend that judicial estoppel applies only to factual posi-
tions, not to opinions or legal conclusions. There is some support for this
view. The greater weight of federal authority, however, supports the posi-
tion that judicial estoppel applies to a party's stated position, regardless of
whether it is an expression of intention, a statement of fact, or a legal
assertion.
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resolution of this matter seemed unlikely.' 7 The Court did not offi-
cially acknowledge judicial estoppel as a viable doctrine until 2001 in
New Hampshire v. Maine,'8 even though it had recognized the principle
behind the doctrine as early as 1895.19 Despite this recognition, how-
ever, New Hampshire did not directly address whether judicial estoppel
should apply to nonfactual positions. Nevertheless, the Court's official
recognition of the doctrine in New Hampshire lends new meaning to
the Court's reasoning in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,20
which was decided two years earlier and indicates that the Court is
concerned with the issue.
While the Court in Cleveland did not tether its decision to the
doctrine of judicial estoppel, it did not reverse a grant of summary
judgment that the district court based on the doctrine, in part be-
cause the inconsistent positions were legal conclusions and not
"purely factual matters." 21 The plaintiff in that case, after suffering a
stroke and losing her job, claimed that she was unable to work; as a
result, she was awarded Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
benefits. 22 She then sued her former employer under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming that she could have performed
her job with reasonable accommodations.2 3 Although its decision fo-
cused on the interplay between the SSDI and ADA statutes, 24 the
Id. (citations omitted); see In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It has been
said that judicial estoppel applies only to positions on questions of fact. We disagree."
(citing United States v. Siegel, 472 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1979))).
17 The obscurity of the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel made Supreme Court review even
less likely. See United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993) (calling judicial
estoppel "an obscure doctrine").
18 532 U.S. 742 (2001).
19 See id. at 749. The Court stated:
[W] here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and suc-
ceeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because
his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to
the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly
taken by him.
Id. (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895)).
20 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
21 See id. at 802-03, 807.
L2 Id. at :/Y .
23 Id. at 799.
24 Id. at 797-98. The Court's choice to focus on the ADA and SSDI statutes, and thus
the fact that this case concerns the disabled, rather than any discussion of the legal work-
ings of judicial estoppel can perhaps be explained as a nod in the direction of public
sentiment. The situation in which Ms. Cleveland found herself is a frequent one, and as
soon as the Supreme Court granted certiorari, scholars began speaking out against the use
ofjudicial estoppel to prevent these claims. See Paul B. Ferrara, Comment, Avoiding Injus-
tice: Let's Shut the Door on the Use ofJudicial Estoppel in ADA Claims, 3 T.M. COOLEYJ. PRAC. &
CLINICAL L. 215, 216 (2000) (concluding that judicial estoppel frustrates the purpose and
spirit of the ADA); Christine Neylon O'Brien, To Tell the Truth: Should Judicial Estoppel Pre-
clude Americans with Disabilities Act Complaints?, 73 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 349, 352 (1999) (argu-
ing that judicial estoppel should not be automatically applied in ADA cases); Solum, supra
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Court in Cleveland did express doubts about the propriety of using
judicial estoppel when the contradictory positions taken are not fac-
tual assertions, such as "'The light was red/green,' or 'I can/cannot
raise my arm above my head."' 25 These two hypothetical contradic-
tions, to which the Court presumably would apply estoppel, are clearly
positions of fact. Whether a traffic light was red or green at a particu-
lar point in time does not depend on the applicable law. The actual
positions asserted by the plaintiff in Cleveland, on the other hand, pre-
sent questions of mixed law and fact; that is, they turn on whether the
requirements of a particular statute have been met. Had Cleveland not
preceded the Court's acceptance of judicial estoppel in New Hamp-
shire, one might have been able to construe Cleveland as settling the
circuit split in favor of applying judicial estoppel only to positions of
fact. Instead, however, the circuits have continued to develop their
own doctrines of judicial estoppel. Given this divergence, it seems
likely that the post-New Hampshire Court will choose to revisit the stan-
dard for situations in which judicial estoppel may be used for legal
positions.
This Note considers whether judicial estoppel should be applied
to contradictory positions of law applied to the facts, and if so,
whether the doctrine should also be available for contradictory posi-
tions of pure law. One might question outright the importance of the
doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, much less the value of delineating which
types of inconsistent positions the doctrine prohibits. After all, the
doctrine is invoked somewhat infrequently compared with its better-
known cousins-claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion
(collateral estoppel).26 Furthermore, even in jurisdictions that do in-
voke the doctrine, cases rarely turn on this issue because courts often
find no direct contradiction in a litigant's two legal positions, and thus
note 1, at 463 (arguing that the Supreme Court should either reject the doctrine ofjudicial
estoppel outright or at least refuse to decide Cleveland on grounds of judicial estoppel).
25 See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802.
26 See Solum, supra note 1, at 468; see also United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378
(5th Cir. 1993) (describingjudicial estoppel as "an obscure doctrine"). Judicial estoppel is
used more frequently in the context of bankruptcy against debtors who failed to list assets,
which are themselves often potential legal claims, on their bankruptcy schedule. See Rob-
ert B. Chapman, Bankruptcy, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1199, 1211-12 (2002). However, these
cases are often very different from nonbankruptcy applications of judicial estoppel, be-
cause bankruptcy courts already have the power to deny a discharge for concealing prop-
erty, to revoke a discharge for fraud, and to reopen cases to amend a bankruptcy schedule,
all of which distinguish these proceedings from most other types of cases. Id. Even the
rationale for the application of judicial estoppel in bankruptcy claims is different. The
doctrine "protect[s] the integrity of the bankruptcy process and... promote[s] finality of
confirmed reorganization orders." Youngblood Group v. Lufkin Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
932 F. Supp. 859, 868 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
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find that the doctrine is inapplicable. 27 However, like many procedu-
ral doctrines, judicial estoppel can produce harsh results for litigants
and corresponding windfalls for their opponents. 28 Windfalls may
easily result because the doctrine requires neither privity nor detri-
mental reliance. 29 Therefore, it is important to consider whether the
purpose of judicial estoppel-to protect the integrity of the courts-
justifies its potentially harsh effects.
This Note provides a novel resolution to this issue of the applica-
bility of judicial estoppel to legal positions by importing considera-
tions from the doctrine of issue preclusion and by examining the
rationale behind judicial estoppel itself.30 Although no court has yet
taken this approach, several considerations used by courts to deter-
mine questions of issue preclusion logically extend to judicial estop-
pel. In the area of issue preclusion, courts have identified several
concerns about the wisdom of applying estoppel to issues of law,
namely, potential unfairness to litigants and ill effects on the courts
themselves. Based on an analysis of both the threat to judicial integ-
rity-the harm judicial estoppel is designed to prevent-and issues of
unfairness deriving from the doctrine of issue preclusion this Note
argues that judicial estoppel should bar contradictory assertions of law
applied to fact, but that it should not bar contradictory positions of
pure law.
27 See, e.g., Maharaj v. Bankamerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1997) (describ-
ing judicial estoppel as applicable to "factual positions," but refusing to apply estoppel on
the basis that "there is no clear inconsistency between plaintiff's present and former posi-
tions" even though the issue-whether the plaintiff remained a shareholder until the disso-
lution of a corporation-was not purely factual); see also Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802-03
(noting that "despite the appearance of conflict that arises from the language of the two
statutes, the two claims do not inherently conflict... because there are too many situations
in which . . . [the] claim[s] can comfortably exist side by side").
28 For an example of the potentially harsh results of judicial estoppel, see Whatley v.
Nike, Inc., No. CIV.98-963-AS, 2000 WL 33201902 (D. Or. Oct. 20, 2000). In that case, the
plaintiff sued Nike for millions of dollars on a patent infringement claim. Nike attempted
to assert judicial estoppel on the ground that the plaintiff, in the dissolution of his mar-
riage, valued "office equipment and patents" at $2250. Id at *1. The plaintiffs ex-wife
asserted that she had knonr, about the natent and believed the dissolution to be fair. Id.
The court refused to applyjudicial estoppel on two grounds, first because the two positions
were not directly contradictory, and more importantly, because the result of limiting the
plaintiff's claim to $2250 would be too harsh even for a doctrine focused on the protection
of the courts and not the parties. Id. at *3.
29 Certainly, the American system ofjustice allows for harsh results in the application
of other rules and doctrines, such as limitations periods or the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981) (applying forum
non conveniens); Drew v. Dep't of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1294 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (applying a
limitations period); Griffin v. Dana Point Condominium Ass'n, 768 F. Supp. 1299, 1304
(N.D. III. 1991) (same).
30 For a discussion of the relationship between these two doctrines, see Allen v. Zu-
rich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982).
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Part I discusses the general elements of the doctrine of judicial
estoppel and the distinction among positions of fact, positions of law
applied to fact, and positions of pure law. Part II examines the stance
of each of the U.S. courts of appeals on whether judicial estoppel
should apply to inconsistent assertions other than those that are
purely factual. Although this analysis highlights a split among the cir-
cuits, it also underscores the fact that the courts have not provided
sufficient reasoning to determine which, if any, of their approaches is
justified. Part III introduces those considerations that this Note will
apply. This Part first analyzes the rationale for judicial estoppel, then
identifies the impetus for courts to apply the doctrine of issue preclu-
sion to positions of pure law applied to fact, and to pure law. Part IV
analyzes whether the application of judicial estoppel to positions of
law applied to fact and pure law is justified in light of the considera-
tions presented in Part III, and concludes that although courts should
apply judicial estoppel to bar a party's inconsistent positions of law
applied to fact, it should not prevent parties from asserting inconsis-
tent positions of pure law.
I
DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AND THE CONTOURS
OF THE LAW/FACT DISTINCTION
A. Judicial Estoppel in General
Left without guidance, the U.S. courts of appeals have developed
various versions of judicial estoppel. Indeed, before New Hampshire v.
Maine,31 the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits expressly re-
jected judicial estoppel, and may continue to do so. 32 Despite this, a
uniform justification for the doctrine nonetheless exists. Those cir-
cuits that have developed the doctrine agree that its purpose is to pro-
tect judicial integrity.3 3 In addition, several courts have justified the
31 532 U.S. 742 (2001).
32 See United States v. 162 Megamania Gambling Devices, 231 F.3d 713, 726 (10th Cir.
2000); United Mine Workers of-Am. 1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 984 F.2d 469, 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1993). The Tenth Circuit may be moving toward acceptance of the doctrine, although
its acceptance is far from clear. Thus far, one district court in that circuit has applied
judicial estoppel on the grounds that New Hampshire v. Maine mandates acceptance of the
doctrine. See United States v. McCall, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211 (D. N.M. 2002) ("[T]he
U.S. Supreme Court recently found judicial estoppel to be a legitimate doctrine to be
utilized by the courts, thereby overruling the Tenth Circuit's position on this issue."). Ac-
ceptance has also been urged by a Tenth Circuit judge in a concurrence, although the
court did not decide the case on the basis ofjudicial estoppel. See Beem v. McKune, 317
F.3d 1175, 1186 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Now is the time to embrace the invitation extended by
the Supreme Court in New Hampshire and join other circuits in reining in those litigants
who play 'fast and loose with the courts.'" (O'Brien, J., concurring) (quoting Sperling v.
United States, 692 F.2d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 1982) (Graafeiland, J., concurring))).
33 See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001).
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doctrine by reference to the need to protect the sanctity of a litigant's
oath.34 Jurists have described the threat to courts' integrity as occur-
ring when litigants "'play[ ] fast and loose with the courts to suit the
exigencies of self interest'- 35 or "'abus [e] the judicial process through
cynical gamesmanship, achieving success on one position, then argu-
ing the opposite to suit an exigency of the moment.' "36 Courts main-
tain this rationale despite the windfall benefits accruing to some
parties who successfully assertjudicial estoppel.3 7 The Supreme Court
has stated that "[b]ecause the rule is intended to prevent 'improper
use of judicial machinery,' . . . judicial estoppel 'is an equitable doc-
trine invoked by a court at its discretion.' 38
Notwithstanding their uniform justification of the doctrine, the
circuits have not agreed on its precise contours. First, although the
doctrine is typically used to preclude inconsistent positions taken in
subsequent litigation, several courts have held that the doctrine may
apply in the same proceeding. 39 Second, the circuits have disputed
whether or not a court must have accepted the earlier position.40 The
majority approach has required this before a party can be barred from
contradicting itself.41 The minority approach allows estoppel even if
the first court did not accept the position, but only if the litigant is
obviously and intentionally playing "fast and loose" with the court.42
However, in New Hampshire, the Supreme Court appeared to endorse
the majority approach by offering three factors it considered relevant
to the determination of whether judicial estoppel should apply:
34 For a discussion of this justification for judicial estoppel and its potential conflicts
with the traditional rationale, see generally Rand G. Boyers, Comment, Precluding Inconsis-
tent Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1244, 1249-54 (1986).
35 In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Brandon v.
Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988)).
36 Warda v. Comm'r, 15 F.3d 533, 538 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Teledyne Indus., Inc.
v. NLRB., 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990)).
37 In Reynolds v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1988), for example, judicial estoppel
was used to bar the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from attributing a capital gain to the
petitioner because the IRS had succeeded in having his ex-wife claim the gain in her bank-
ruptcy proceeding. The petitioner avoided taxes in excess of $370,000. See id. at 471, 474.
38 NMer Ham' pshire. 532 U.S. at 752 (quoting Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 938
(D.C. Cir. 1980) and Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990), respectively).
39 See, e.g., Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 605 (9th Cir.
1996) (citing Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 716 (9th Cir.
1990)).
40 For a more in depth discussion of this dispute, see Ashley S. Deeks, Comment,
Raising the Cost of Lying: Rethinking Erie for Judicial Estoppel 64 U. CHi. L. REv. 873, 876-79
(1997).
41 See In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 206 (5th Cir. 1999); Hossaini v. W. Mo.
Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1140, 1143 (8th Cir. 1998) (describing the approach requiringjudicial
acceptance as the majority approach).
42 See Hossaini, 140 F.3d at 1143 (internal quotation marks omitted); Patriot Cinemas,
Inc. v. Gen. Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987).
198 [Vol. 89:191
2003] JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
First, a party's later position must be clearly inconsistent with its ear-
lier position. Second, courts regularlyoinquire whether the party has
succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier posi-
tion, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later
proceeding would create the perception that either the first or the
second court was misled. Absent success in a prior proceeding, a party's
later inconsistent position introduces no risk of inconsistent court deternina-
tions and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity. A third considera-
tion is whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position
would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on
the opposing party if not estopped. 43
The Court, however, expressly disclaimed that these factors were ei-
ther "inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula. '44
The circuits have also disputed whether judicial estoppel requires
privity, with the majority holding that neither privity nor detrimental
reliance is required. 4 5 These courts reasoned that because the pur-
pose of judicial estoppel is to protect the courts and not the litigants,
prejudice to litigants is irrelevant.46 The circuits still further dispute
whether the Erie doctrine permits federal courts sitting in diversity to
apply their own versions of judicial estoppel or instead mandates that
they apply the interested state's version.4 7 The majority position
seems to be that federal courts may apply federal judicial estoppel be-
43 New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 751.
45 See Hall v. GE Plastic Pac. PTE Ltd., 327 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[Plaintiff]
claims that the district court failed to require a showing of additional 'elements' such as
detrimental reliance, privity, and intent. None of these 'elements' are required under
Fifth Circuit law."); Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355,
360 (3d Cir. 1996).
46 See, e.g., Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002); see
also In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d at 205 ("Because the doctrine is intended to protect
the judicial system, rather than the litigants, detrimental reliance by the opponent of the
party against whom the doctrine is applied is not necessary."); Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982) ("[J]udicial estoppel may be applied even if detri-
mental reliance or privity does not exist."). Unfortunately, when listing factors to consider
in New Hampshire v. Maine, the Supreme Court used the language "unfair detriment [to]
the opposing party." 532 U.S. at 751. This should not be considered an endorsement of
the detrimental reliance view; rather this language addresses the culpability of the party
being estopped. See infra Part III.A. The factor of detrimental reliance more properly falls
under the rubric of equitable estoppel. See Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598; MarkJ. Plumer, Note,
Judicial Estoppel: The Refurbishing of a Judicial Shield, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 409, 416-17
(1987). Equitable estoppel, like judicial estoppel, prevents a litigant from contradicting a
position that he has taken in a prior proceeding. Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598. Unlike judicial
estoppel, however, equitable estoppel also is designed to protect litigants from "less than
scrupulous opponents." Id. Therefore, privity is a prerequisite, and whether a party will
suffer a detriment if a position is not precluded is relevant. Plumer, supra, at 416-17.
47 See Deeks, supra note 40, at 874.
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cause the protection of the integrity of federal courts implicates
strong federal interests. 48  i..
B. The Law/Fact Distinction
The significance of whether a position or issue is one of fact, law,
or a mixture thereof is by no means unique to judicial estoppel. For
example, appellate standards of review depend upon whether the
lower court decided a question of law or fact.49 The distinction is sim-
ilarly relevant in federal habeas corpus law, under which the designa-
tion of an issue as one of fact, mixed law and fact, or pure law can
determine the power granted 'to the federal court. 50  One habeas
scholar described such a situation:
For example, if the question 'is whether a defendant's confession
was voluntary, the definition of "voluntary" is a matter of pure law,
while the question whether the defendant's allegation that he or
she was denied food and sleep for twenty-four hours is true is a pure
question of fact. If the defendant's allegation of fact is found to be
true, then the question whether the confession meets the legal defi-
nition of "voluntary" is a matter of applying the law to the facts and
falls into the category of a mixed question of law and fact.5 1
This example also illustrates that the distinction is blurred. That is,
the different variations form a continuum from pure law to pure fact
rather than three hermetically sealed categories. 52 Nonetheless, dis-
tinguishing amongst these three positions-pure fact, pure law, and
law applied to fact-is possible.
The Supreme Court in Cleveland53 defined a position of "fact" in
the context of judicial estoppel when it stated that a "purely factual
matter[ ]" is of the type: "'The light was red/green,' or 'I can/cannot
raise my arm above my head.' 54 In general, facts are the "who, when,
48 For a discussion of decisions dealing with the Erie question, see Rissetto v. Plumbers
& Streamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 602-04 (9th Cir. 1996) and Deeks, supra note 40, at
882-86.
49 At the appellate level, questions of law are often reviewed de novo and questions of
fact are generally reviewed with much more deference to the lower court. See Kevin Casey
et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR.
B.J. 279, 316 (2002).
50 See David McCord, Visions of Habeas, 1994 BYU L. REV. 735, 811-14 (1994).
51 See id. at 811 n.225.
52 See id. at 811 n.22; Casey et al., supra note 49, at 318.
53 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
54 Id. at 802.
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what, and where. '55 They involve only questions of what actually oc-
curred and require no knowledge of any legal standard.
56
At the opposite end of the continuum are purely legal matters,
defined as "'legal issues unrelated to the facts of the case."' 57 Thus,
an interrogatory seeking an opposing party's analysis of the applicabil-
ity of a federal statute to a provision of a union constitution presents a
question of pure law.58 Questions of law may be defined as "fact-free
general statements applicable to all-or at least to many-cases." 59
Most positions of pure law will involve the interpretation of some con-
stitution, statute, or common law doctrine, such as whether a death
penalty statute is constitutional, 60 whether a statute waives a state's sov-
ereign immunity,6 1 or "whether a defendant may collaterally chal-
lenge prior state convictions for federal sentencing purposes."
62
Between these two extremes lie positions of law applied to fact,
often called "mixed questions of law and fact."6 3 A position of mixed
law and fact "is the application of a legal standard (such as negli-
gence) to the pure facts (what the defendant did) to yield a legal con-
clusion (the defendant was or was not negligent). "64 As the Supreme
Court has stated: "'[T] he historical facts are admitted or established,
the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy
the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard .... ,,,65 For in-
stance, whether a police officer had probable cause to arrest a suspect
is a mixed question of law and fact because it depends both upon the
specific facts leading up to the arrest and the legal standard of proba-
ble cause.66 Other examples include a "determination of employment
55 Casey et al., supra note 49, at 317; Jay E. Rosenblum, The Appropriate Standard of
Review for a Finding of Bad Faith, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1546, 1569-70 (1992).
56 See Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 2002);
Forrest G. Alogna, Note, Double Jeopardy, Acquittal Appeals, and the Law-Fact Distinction, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 1131, 1154 (2001).
57 O'Brien v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 443 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b) advisory committee note to 1970 amend.).
58 Id. at 1187-88.
59 Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and
Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural
Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REv. 993, 1019 (1986).
60 See Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1986).
61 See Craven v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218, 1231 (10th Cir. 2001).
62 United States v. Smith, 94 F.3d 204, 211 (6th Cir. 1996).
63 See, e.g., Onielas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64 Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 2002).
65 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696-97 (alterations in original) (quoting Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982)).
66 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 314 F.3d 430, 433 (9th Cir. 2002), amended and
superseded by 322 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Fiasconaro, 315 F.3d 28, 30 (1st
Cir. 2002).
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status" 67 and whether, in a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty, a mis-
representation was material. 68
II
SURVEYING THE CURRENT LAW OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL ON
INCONSISTENT POSITIONS OF LAW APPLIED To FACT AND PURE LAW IN
THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
First Circuit
The First Circuit has indicated in passing that it will apply judicial
estoppel to parties attempting to contradict their previous legal posi-
tions.69 It is unclear, however, how far the court will go on the spec-
trum from questions of mixed law and fact to questions of pure law.
In Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., the court described
"classic" judicial estoppel as a case in which "a litigant asserts inconsis-
tent statements of fact or adopts inconsistent positions on combined
questions of fact and law."'70 It listed as examples "a litigant . . .
claim[ing] both that a law firm did and did not represent her[,]" and
"a party ... claiming that he was both an employee and not an em-
ployee of the defendant."71 Few scenarios beyond these examples are
certain, however. In Patriot Cinemas, the court applied judicial estop-
pel to prevent a party from contradicting its stated intention not to
pursue one count of its claim.7 2 A district court, in UNUM Corp. v.
United States, argued that Patriot Cinemas therefore did not extend judi-
cial estoppel to legal positions at all:73
[T]he earlier statement was an assertion made to a court that [Pa-
triot Cinemas] would not proceed on a particular claim in another
court, and, therefore, was a "legal" assertion only in the sense that it
"pertained to legal proceedings." The case does not provide au-
thority for the ... argument... that inconsistent legal opinions of a
litigant's counsel can invoke the application of judicial estoppel. 74
Therefore, although the First Circuit's preclusion of an inconsistent
intention suggests a move toward judicial estoppel for at least some
legal positions, the current decisions do not conclusively answer the
question for the categories o-f law. applie to fac-t and puire l'Ia.
67 Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 n.1 (6th Cir. 1992).
68 SeeJames v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 305 F.3d 439, 449 (6th Cir. 2002).
69 See Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67, 82 (1st Cir. 1999); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. Gen.
Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 214 (1st Cir. 1987).
70 Patriot Cinemas, 834 F.2d at 214.
71 Id.
72 Id
73 UNUM Corp. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 150, 159 n.14 (D. Me. 1995).
74 Id.
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Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has held that judicial estoppel applies only to
inconsistent factual positions. 75 Thus far, the Second Circuit's lower
courts have scrupulously followed this rule.7 6 For instance, the Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of New York has refused to apply
judicial estoppel to a litigant's positions on whether an act of Con-
gress had ratified a particular appropriation of land. The court rea-
soned that "no legal authority" allows judicial estoppel to be applied
to nonfactual positions. 77
It is difficult, if not impossible, to discern why the Second Circuit
has chosen to impose this limitation. For instance, in TLC Beatrice In-
ternational Holdings, Inc. v. Cigna Insurance Co., the Southern District of
New York refused to apply judicial estoppel to contrary positions re-
garding the characterization of a claim as either a derivative suit or a
direct action. 78 The court stated that "[t]he statements sought to be
used as the basis for estoppel must be presented as statements of
proveable facts within the knowledge of the party, and not statements
of opinion. '79 However, the cases cited as authority provide only luke-
warm support, and little explanation. The first case cited, Stella v. Gra-
ham-Paige Motors Corp., for example, "refus[ed] to apply judicial
estoppel because prior statements were not statements of fact, but
rather statements of opinion made in the regular course of busi-
ness.'' ° Stella, however, did not deal with the law/fact distinction at
all, but the distinction between a fact (the cost of a particular share of
stock) and an estimation or guess, which, although termed an opin-
ion, differs from one regarding the application of a law or a statute.81
In addition, the court clearly refused to permit estoppel primarily be-
cause to do so would dangerously extend the doctrine to statements
made, not in court, or even in a quasi-judicial setting, but "in the regu-
75 Mulvaney Mech., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 38, 288 F.3d 491,
504 (2d Cir. 2002) ("We have held that a party requesting judicial estoppel must demon-
strate ... that.., the party against whom estoppel is sought has pursued an inconsistent
factual position .... [The instant] legal conclusions are not 'inconsistent factual positions'
as would ordinarily justify judicial estoppel."), vacated on other grounds by 123 S. Ct. 1572
(2003); see Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1037 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The doc-
trine ofjudicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a factual position in a legal pro-
ceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken by him in a prior legal
proceeding.").
76 See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Treadwell Corp., 58 F. Supp. 2d 77, 93 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) ("[S]uch an issue is one of law, not fact .... .. making judicial estoppel
inapplicable.").
77 SeeSeneca Nation of Indians v. NewYork, 26 F. Supp. 2d 555, 565 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
78 No. 97-Civ.8589 (MBM), 1999 WL 33454, at * 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1999).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Co., 259 F.2d 476, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1958).
2003] 203
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lar course of business."82 No other case provides an explanation to
account for the Second Circuit's refusal to permit estoppel to bar in-
consistent legal positions.
Third Circuit
The Third Circuit has expressed its intention to allow judicial es-
toppel to prevent parties from adopting inconsistent positions of law
applied to fact.83 For instance, Montrose Medical Group Participating
Savings Plan v. Bulger discussed the applicability of judicial estoppel
after the plaintiffs contradicted their earlier position on whether a re-
tirement plan was covered by ERISA.8 4 The court recognized that
"[t] hough the question whether a particular plan is covered by ERISA
may not be one of pure law, it is also not a 'purely factual mat-
ter'... ."85 While the court declined to apply judicial estoppel, it did
so on the ground that the prior position had not been judicially ac-
cepted, and not because the position was a legal one. 6
The Third Circuit may also allow estoppel on positions of pure
law. In EF Operating Corp. v. American Buildings, counsel for EF
presented a new position at oral arguments that contradicted his legal
argument to the district court and his representations in the appellate
brief.87 The court described the earlier position as "the legal argu-
ment that consignees cannot assert equitable defenses such as prepay-
ment to shipper when the carrier has not recovered its freight charges
from the shipper-consignor." 88 Stated as such, detached from the
facts of the case, this position appears to be one of pure law. The
court then applied judicial estoppel, stating that "under the circum-
stances here, a reviewing court may properly consider the representa-
tions made in the appellate brief to be binding as a form ofjudicial
estoppel, and decline to address a new legal argument based on a
later repudiation of those representations. '8 9
An earlier decision by this circuit applied estoppel to legal posi-
tions, which were clearly pure law. In Murray v. Silberstein, a bail com-
missioner who had been discharged from his office initially asserted
that, because the Eleventh Amendment's Immunity Clause would pre-
vent him from recovering lost wages even if he won his claim for
82 Id. at 482.
83 See Hardwick v. Cuomo, 891 F.2d 1097, 1105 n.14 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[T]his court has
recognized the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bind parties to factual and legal positions
taken in litigation .... ").
84 Montrose Med. Group Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 783 (3d Cir.
2001).
85 Id. (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 802 (1999)).
86 See Montrose Med., 243 F.3d at 783-84.
87 EF Operating Corp. v. Am. Bldgs., 993 F.2d 1046, 1049-50 (3d Cir. 1993).
88 Id. at 1050.
89 Id.
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wrongful discharge, the court should grant a preliminary injunction
to preserve his employment during the disposition of that claim. 90
The court granted the injunction, but the plaintiff ultimately lost his
claim for wrongful discharge. 91 Nevertheless, the injunction had kept
the plaintiff in office for all but five weeks during the original disposi-
tion.92 On appeal, the court pointed to the Eleventh Amendment's
Immunity Clause and indicated that the appeal might be moot.93 In
response, the plaintiff amended his original complaint to seek lost
wages for these five weeks, and argued that the Immunity Clause did
not prevent recovery of lost wages by a state officer. 94 And on this
purely legal issue of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a claim
for lost wages by a state officer, the court applied judicial estoppel and
refused to allow Murray to seek damages. 95
Fourth Circuit
In earlier decisions, the Fourth Circuit was willing to apply judi-
cial estoppel to contradictory positions of law applied to fact,96 and
perhaps even to contradictory positions of pure law.97 In recent years,
however, the court has indicated that judicial estoppel will apply only
to factual positions. For instance, in 1000 Friends of Maryland v.
Browner, the court stated that "the position sought to be estopped
must be one of fact rather than law or legal theory."98 And in Pittston
Co. v. United States, the court explained that "U]udicial estoppel ap-
plies only to the making of inconsistent statements of fact, and there-
fore is of no relevance to [the litigant's] legal contention . . . -99 The
Fourth Circuit has even reiterated the purpose of the doctrine to re-
flect this limitation, stating that 'judicial estoppel exists to deter the
use of facts from other litigation to manipulate a subsequent court
that is unfamiliar with the prior factual positions assumed by the liti-
gants."'100 However, as with the Second Circuit, no Fourth Circuit de-
90 Murray v. Silberstein, 882 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1989).
91 Id. at 63-64.
92 See id. at 64-65.
93 Id. at 65-66.
94 See id. at 65.
95 Id. at 66.
96 SeeAllen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying judicial
estoppel to "a legal position respecting [the litigant's] employment relationship with
another").
97 See Ragan v. Vosburgh, 110 F.2d 60, 65-66 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying judicial estop-
pel to a position taken regarding the constitutionality of a statewide election scheme for
superior court judges).
98 265 F.3d 216, 226 (4th Cir. 2001); accord Folio v. City of Clarksburg, 134 F.3d 1211,
1217-18 (4th Cir. 1998).
99 Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 701 n.4 (4th Cir. 1999).
100 Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 274 (4th Cir.
2003).
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cision explains why such a distinction exists, or even identifies a point
of origination.
Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has acknowledged that some courts choose to
apply judicial estoppel exclusively to factual positions,1 0 1 but does not
appear to require this itself. For instance, in Jett v. Zink, the court
applied judicial estoppel to a party's contradictory position that a par-
ticular action initially characterized as in personam was quasi in
rem. 10
2
Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue of whether
judicial estoppel may be applied to inconsistent legal positions. How-
ever, several of its decisions indicate that the court will apply this doc-
trine to questions of law applied to fact. For example, the court has
applied judicial estoppel to positions taken not only on the proper
interpretation of a will,' 0 3 but also as to which ex-spouse a capital gain
should be attributed for tax purposes.1 0 4 Both scenarios illustrate a
position of law applied to the facts. However, because no decision
confronts the issue, no rationale is given as to why estoppel was
appropriate.
Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has squarely addressed this issue, and has
decided to apply judicial estoppel to all legal positions. In the case of
In re Cassidy, the court explained:
It has been said that judicial estoppel applies only to positions on
questions of fact. We disagree. We note first that it may be advisa-
ble not to prescribe too many rules for the application of a doctrine
designed to protect the integrity of the courts .... We also observe
a trend away from strict limitation of the doctrine to positions on
matters of fact .... [I] n this case, we think that the change of posi-
on . .n th l~~al qestion is every hit as harmful to the administra-
tion of justice as a change on an issue of fact. 10 5
101 See In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1999).
102 SeeJett v. Zink, 474 F.2d 149, 154-55 (5th Cir. 1973).
103 See Warda v. Comm'r, 15 F.3d 533, 539 (6th Cir. 1994).
104 See Reynolds v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 469, 470 (6th Cir. 1988).
105 In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). But see
Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Uudicial estoppel] bars a
litigant who has obtained a judgment on the basis of proving one set of facts from ob-
taining a second judgment by turning around and proving that the facts were actually the
opposite of what he had proved in the prior case.").
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Cassidy had argued before the Seventh Circuit on an appeal from
tax court to have his tax debt discharged in bankruptcy. 1°6 After the
court ruled that the debt was not dischargeable, Cassidy returned to
bankruptcy court and to argue that the tax court had no jurisdiction
over the question of dischargeability, making the court of appeals's
holding mere dicta.10 7 The Seventh Circuit found that Cassidy was
estopped from arguing that the court of appeals should not have con-
sidered dischargeability when he had argued in that very court to have
the debt declared dischargeable.108 Thus, the Seventh Circuit appears
to recognize judicial estoppel even for inconsistent positions taken on
questions of pure law, because Cassidy's arguments regarding the tax
court's jurisdiction did not depend on the facts of that case. 10 9
Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit has not yet broached the issue of whether ju-
dicial estoppel should apply to inconsistent legal positions. Indeed,
the court has been slow to adopt this doctrine at all; as late as 1998,
the court still found it unnecessary to define the precise elements of
the doctrine. 10
Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit will apply judicial estoppel to a contradictory
position "whether it is an expression of intention, a statement of fact,
or a legal assertion.""'1 The court reasoned in Helfand v. Gerson that
"[t] he integrity of the judicial process is threatened when a litigant is
permitted to gain an advantage by the manipulative assertion of in-
consistent positions, factual or legal."112 Helfand involved a litigant
who first claimed that a will provided for a residence to be held in
trust, then later argued that the will provided for the residence to be
distributed outright.113
It is unclear whether the Ninth Circuit would allowjudicial estop-
pel for an inconsistent issue of pure law. Only a single district court
has thus far addressed the issue, declaring that "[j]udicial estoppel
should not be invoked to freeze an opponent into a position on a
106 In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d at 641.
107 Id. at 639.
108 Id, at 641.
109 See supra Part I.B.
110 See Hossaini v. W. Mo. Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1140, 1143 (8th Cir. 1998).
111 Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1997).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 534-35.
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pure issue of law."' 14 The court made this statement, however, with-
out any explanation as to why this should be the case.
Tenth Circuit
While the Tenth Circuit appears to be moving towards accept-
ance ofjudicial estoppel in general, it has not yet applied the doctrine
in a circuit-level decision." 5 At this time, it is not clear whether the
Tenth Circuit will apply the doctrine to positions of pure law or law
applied to fact even if it does accept the doctrine in cases involving
contradictory factual positions.
Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit has not treated the question of whether ju-
dicial estoppel should apply to legal positions. For example, a recent
decision states simply that "Uludicial estoppel is applied to the calcu-
lated assertion of divergent sworn positions," but does not expound
upon the types of positions included.' 16
District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit has rejected the doctrine ofjudi-
cial estoppel. 1 17
Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit will apply judicial estoppel to inconsistent le-
gal positions, 118 but it is uncertain whether this includes positions
taken with respect to questions of pure law.
III
SETrING OUT THE APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATIONS: UTILIZING
JUSTIFICATIONS DRAWN FROM JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AND ISSUE
PRECLUSION
As previously mentioned, the application of judicial estoppel can
yield harsh results as well as excessive rewards for litigants.1 1 9 This
Note ths act...milj C, to. res.o.JIve theC qutio.3LJ of' whedher the r.I*C.i..
behind judicial estoppel-to protect the integrity of courts-justifies
114 County of Stanislaus v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. CV-F-93-5866-OWW, 1994 WL
706711, at *21 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 1994).
115 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
116 United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1324 (lth Cir. 2001).
117 United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 984 F.2d 469, 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
118 See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
119 See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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such harshness when the inconsistent position being estopped is one
of law applied to the facts or one of pure law, in light of counter-
vailing policy considerations. The preceding Part established that the
circuits have not adopted a uniform approach to estopping inconsis-
tent legal positions, nor have they provided any significant explana-
tion for taking any given stance. This Part, therefore, analyzes the
policies for and against the use of issue preclusion for matters of law
applied to fact or pure law as well as the rationale behind judicial
estoppel. These considerations, not previously examined together-if
at all-by the courts of appeals, form the basis of Part IV's resolution
of this matter.
A. Examining the Rationale Behind Judicial Estoppel
It is generally considered the purpose of judicial estoppel to pro-
tect the integrity of the courts, 120 or more explicitly, "to protect the
judiciary, as an institution, from the perversion of judicial machin-
ery."' 21 Although courts occasionally assert that judicial estoppel is
designed "to preserve the sanctity of the oath,"'122 these same courts
also cite the protection ofjudicial integrity, 123 which is considered the
"universal" justification.1 24 Because the purpose of the doctrine is to
protect the courts, and not the litigants, judicial estoppel can even be
raised sua sponte. 125 The harm to judicial integrity occurs when a liti-
gant engages in "cynical gamesmanship, achieving success on one po-
sition, then arguing the opposite to suit an exigency of the
moment."' 2 6 If a litigant is allowed to prevail on contradictory posi-
tions in different courts, it inescapably follows that one court was
wrong, misled, or perhaps even defrauded. 127
This rationale behind judicial estoppel can be seen in the re-
quirements of the doctrine itself. A party cannot be estopped unless
its second position is clearly inconsistent with its earlier position,
which the court must have accepted;1 28 otherwise there is no risk of
120 See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001); Montrose Med.
Group Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 779 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001).
121 Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982).
122 See Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
123 See id. For a discussion of the roots ofjudicial estoppel and the formation of both
rationales, see Douglas W. Henkin, Comment, Judicial Estoppel-Beating Shields into Swords
and Back Again, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1711, 1725-27 (1991).
124 See New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749.
125 See Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 530 (5th Cir. 2000).
126 Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990).
127 See New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750; Darland v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 317 F.3d 516,
529-30 (6th Cir. 2003) ("IT]he purpose of the doctrine ... is to reduce fraud in the legal
process by forcing a modicum of consistency on a repeating litigant.")
128 New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2003]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
inconsistent judgments. It would logically follow that, because when-
ever a second position contradicts an earlier accepted position there is
necessarily a risk of inconsistent results, the application ofjudicial es-
toppel would have no further requirements. However, many courts
have explicitly held that judicial estoppel should not be applied when
a litigant has taken contradictory positions due to mistake or inadver-
tence. 129 And the doctrine has long included language suggesting
that before judicial estoppel will apply, the party switching positions
must have some degree of culpability and there must not be a good
reason for the switch. 130 The Third Circuit has established a require-
ment that "the party changed his or her position in bad faith, i.e., in a
culpable manner threatening to the court's authority or integrity."'131
The remaining circuits phrase the purpose ofjudicial estoppel in such
a way as to clarify that they too require culpability. For example, the
First Circuit allows judicial estoppel to be used "when a litigant is
'playing fast and loose with the courts,' and when 'intentional self-
contradiction is being used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage
in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice."' 132 The Fourth Cir-
cuit seeks to prevent litigants from "blowing hot and cold as the occa-
sion demands,"'133 while the Seventh Circuit seeks "to protect the
judicial system from being whipsawed with inconsistent arguments." 134
129 See, e.g., Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 776 (6th Cir. 2002).
130 See Scarano v. Cent. R.R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953) ("[The] use of
inconsistent positions would most flagrantly exemplify that playing fast and loose with the
courts which has been emphasized as an evil the courts should not tolerate." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
131 Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 835 (3d Cir. 2002).
132 Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. Gen. Cinema Corp. 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987) (quot-
ing Scarano, 203 F.3d at 513).
133 Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 n.3 (4th Cir. 1982).
134 Bethesda Lutheran Homes & Servs., Inc. v. Born, 238 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2001).
Similar language exists in the opinions of every circuit that has accepted the doctrine. See,
e.g., Second Circuit. Young v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 882 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1989)
("[Judicial estoppel] is supposed to protect judicial integrity by preventing litigants from
playing fast and loose with courts, thereby avoiding unfair results and unseemliness." (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Fifth Circuit. Texaco Inc. v. Duh6, 274 F.3d 911, 923 (5th
Cir. 2001) ("Litigants undermine the integrity of the judicial process when they deliber-
ately tailor coiuadictur-y (as opposcd to altcrnate) psitions to the ex;gencies of the mo-
ment." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sixth Circuit Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB,
911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Uudicial estoppel] preserves the integrity of the
courts by preventing a party from abusing the judicial process through cynical gamesman-
ship, achieving success on one position, then arguing the opposite to suit an exigency of
the moment."); Eighth Circuit Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Davis, 822 F.2d 734, 737 n.6 (8th Cir.
1987) ("The purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process.
As we read the caselaw, this is tantamount to a knowing misrepresentation to or even fraud
on the court."); Ninth Circuit Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597,
600 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Judicial estoppel ... precludes a party from gaining an advantage by
taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible posi-
tion."); Eleventh Circuit. Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (l1th Cir.
2002) (observing that for judicial estoppel to apply, the "'inconsistencies must be shown to
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has considered "whether the party
seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair ad-
vantage .. . if not estopped."'' l - 5
It therefore follows that the rationale behind judicial estoppel, to
protect judicial integrity, manifests itself in two ways. First, and most
importantly, it prevents inconsistent judgments, safeguarding from
the impression that one of the two courts is wrong.136 Second, it pro-
tects against the "evil" of litigants intentionally attempting to force
such a result on the courts. 137
B. Considering the Treatment of the Law/Fact Distinction
Under the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion
1. Preclusion for Situations in Which the Future Litigation Was
Unforeseeable
In discussing the doctrine of issue preclusion, courts have ex-
pressed concern that it is unfair to hold a party to an earlier decision
that would bind that party in unforeseeable future litigation because
the party will have had no incentive to litigate issues fully.' 38 For ex-
ample, suppose that a chemical plant has a $5000 nuisance action
brought against it for allegedly emitting vapors that are foul smelling
but harmless. If the plant is found to be emitting the vapors, would it
be fair to hold the plant to that determination later if it turns out that
the vapors cause cancer, from which hundreds of people are suffer-
ing? Assuming that there was no reason to know at the time of the
first suit that the vapors caused cancer, the plant may have forgone a
solid defense, such as pointing to a plant down the road, because the
cost of litigation would have exceeded the $5000 at stake in the initial
litigation. The Supreme Court has stated that if the amount at stake
in the first suit is significantly less than in subsequent suits, estoppel
may be unfair.'3 9 The Restatement (Second) ofJudgments codifies a lim-
have been calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system'") (quoting Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, 260 F.3d 1302, 1308 (lth Cir. 2001)).
135 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 751 (2001).
136 See id. at 750.
137 See In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990).
138 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 (1979); Remington Rand
Corp. v. Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank, 68 F.3d 1478, 1487 (2d Cir. 1995); ROBERT C. CASAD
& KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RESJUDICATA 139-41 (2001).
139 See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330 ("A second argument against offensive use of
collateral estoppel is that it may be unfair to a defendant. If a defendant in the first action
is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have little incentive to defend vigorously,
particularly if future suits are not foreseeable."). The dollar figure attached to the first
litigation can carry significant weight in an analysis of whether a litigant had an incentive to
litigate fully. For example, in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that
a judgment of $68,000 against manufacturers of asbestos-bearing insulation for a worker
who developed asbestosis could have no preclusive effects in a multimillion dollar asbestos
lawsuit. 681 F.2d 334, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1982).
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ited version of this exception at section 8(5), although the drafters
believed that this exception should apply only rarely. 140 According to
the Restatement,
relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action . .. is not precluded
[when] ... [t]here is a clear and convincing need for a new deter-
mination of the issue . . .because it was not sufficiently foreseeable
at the time of the initial action that the issue would arise in the
context of a subsequent action, or ... because the party sought to
be precluded, as a result of... special circumstances, did not have
an adequate . . .incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in
the initial action.14 1
The idea that it is unfair to hold a party to earlier litigation when
future litigation was unforeseeable may also be applied to judicial es-
toppel, as at least one court has suggested. 142 Part of the purpose
behind preclusion doctrines such as judicial estoppel and issue preclu-
sion is to discourage future litigants from attempting to take positions
that harm the court or waste resources; that purpose is in no way
served when future litigation is unforeseeable.1 43 Although judicial
estoppel and issue preclusion do not have an identical purpose, they
do have similarities. Like judicial estoppel, issue preclusion prevents
inconsistent decisions and thus protects the integrity of the courts.144
Issue preclusion can also promote judicial efficiency and the finality of
judgments, neither of which involve the individual litigant.1 45 For all
these reasons, courts are troubled by the "inadequacy of the opportu-
nity or incentive [for the litigant] to have fully litigated the issue in
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. i (1982); see CASAD & CLERMONT,
supra note 138, at 140-41.
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28(5) (1982).
142 See United States v. Hussein, 178 F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
application ofjudicial estoppel was inappropriate for a position taken on the expiration of
a statute of limitations not only because the position was legal and not factual, but also
because the defendant had no incentive to argue for a different expiration date in the first
litigation).
143 See Robert Ziff, Note, For One Litigant's Sole Relief: Unforeseeable Preclusion and the Sec-
ond Restatement, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 905, 906 (1992).
Resjudicata is a harsh doctrine, which deprives the precluded party of even
an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the case. Consequently, preclu-
sion is only justified when it advances important policies of the court sys-
tem, such as lowering litigation costs or allowing successful litigants a sense
of repose. These and other benefits of res judicata are based on the pros-
pect of future preclusion affecting the behavior of both the parties and
future litigants. When preclusion is unforeseeable, it cannot influence the
actions of anyone and, worse, causes confusion that is counterproductive.
Id.
144 See Eli J. Richardson, Taking Issue with Issue Preclusion: Reinventing Collateral Estoppel,
65 Miss. L.J. 41, 45-46 (1995).
145 Id.
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the first action."'146 Therefore, these considerations, while raised in
the context of issue preclusion, are equally applicable to judicial es-
toppel. The court can similarly inquire as to whether a litigant had
reason to foresee future litigation in which his or her earlier position
would be binding, or, if such litigation was foreseeable, whether the
eventual costs of taking a particular position were not foreseeable, so
that the litigant lacked incentive to litigate fully in the first lawsuit.
2. Preclusion That Would Interfere with a Court's Administration or
Develapment of the Law
The doctrine of issue preclusion has also explicitly recognized an
exception to its application for certain situations involving issues of
pure law, referred to as "unmixed questions of law."'1 4 7 Issue preclu-
sion will not apply "when the previously determined issue is one of
law," and "'a new determination is warranted in order to take account
of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise
to avoid inequitable administration of the laws.' ' ' 148  Courts have
adopted this formulation from the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments, an
influential work in the field. 14 9 The drafters of the Restatement ex-
plained that "[a] rule of law declared in an action between two parties
should not be binding on them for all time, when other litigants are
free to urge that the rule should be rejected. Such a rule might un-
duly delay needed changes in the law and might deprive a litigant of a
right that the court was prepared to recognize for other litigants in
the same position."'150 Nor is this exclusion concerned solely with fair-
ness to litigants; the interests of the courts are also at issue:
"Especially ... where pure questions of law are presented, courts
and commentators both have recognized that the interests of final-
ity and judicial economy may be outweighed by other substantive
policies, for in this circumstance '[t]he interests of courts and liti-
gants alike can be protected adequately by the flexible principles of
stare decisis.'"151
As for nonmutual issue preclusion, courts have refused to give an
issue preclusive effect when the issue "is 'one of law and treating it as
146 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Symposium, Preclusion as to Issues of Law: The Legal System's
Interest, 70 IOwA L. REv. 81, 86 (1984).
147 See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162-63 (1979); Burlington N. R.R. Co.
v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1233 (3d Cir. 1995).
148 Burlington N. R.R. Co., 63 F.3d at 1237 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJuDC-
METS § 28(2) (1982)).
149 See id.
150 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. b (1982).
151 Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 26 F. Supp. 2d 555, 569 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
(quoting Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1356 (2d Cir. 1992)), rev'd on
other grounds, 509 U.S. 155 (1993); see also Hiroshi Motomura, UsingJudgments As Evidence,
70 MINN. L. REV. 979, 1018 (1986).
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conclusively determined would inappropriately foreclose [opportuni-
ties] for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon which it was
based."'" 152 In describing this exception in the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, the drafters explained that when such an issue is precluded,
"the court is foreclosed from an opportunity to reconsider the applica-
ble rule, and thus perform its function of developing the law."153 The
drafters felt this consideration was particularly important when (1)
there is a difference in the forums involved (i.e., when the earlier liti-
gation was decided in a trial court and the subsequent litigation will
probably be resolved in an appellate court); (2) when the first action
was decided in an appellate court, and the appellate court of the sec-
ond action has coordinate or subordinate jurisdiction with the first; or
(3) "when the issue is of general interest and has not been resolved by
the highest appellate court that can resolve it."11 54
The law of issue preclusion in this area is thus concerned with
several problems. First, courts do not apply the law equally to similarly
situated litigants when they hold a party to an interpretation of the law
that they would reconsider for any other party.' 55 Second, refusal to
reconsider an earlier interpretation of the law detrimentally affects
the interests of the court by halting the progress of the law. When a
party, but for estoppel, could have argued for a change in the law, the
court is deprived of this opportunity to advance the law.156 Because
issue preclusion recognizes these problems exclusively for issues of
pure law, their applicability to positions of pure law in judicial estop-
pel is apparent. Further, these considerations are appropriate for the
doctrine of judicial estoppel because of the rationale driving them.
Issue preclusion recognizes exceptions for issues of pure law because
this "reflects the broader institutional concerns of the legal system-
equality and stability between the individual litigants may be sacrificed
in order to preserve the equality and stability of the legal system as a
whole. ' 157 As judicial estoppel also seeks to preserve the stability of
the legal system by protecting it from abuses, 158 it should also be sensi-
tive to the risk that careless application of estoppel will harm that
system.
152 Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. Century
Motor Freight, Inc., 125 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 29(7) (1982)).
153 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. i (1982).
154 Id.
155 See, e.g., Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Fed. Energy Regulation Comm'n,
826 F.2d 1074, 1080 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing the ramifications of disparate treat-
ment of similarly situated parties).
156 See Colin Hugh Buckley, Issue Preclusion and Issues of Law: A Doctrinal Framework
Based on Rules of Recognition, Jurisdiction and Legal History, 24 Hous. L. REv. 875, 899 (1987).
157 Hazard, supra note 146, at 87.
158 See supra Part III.A.
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IV
APPLYING PRINCIPLES DRAWN FROM JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AND
ISSUE PRECLUSION
One may evaluate the desirability of estopping inconsistent posi-
tions of law applied to fact and of pure law by reference to both the
rationale underlying the doctrine of judicial estoppel and the afore-
mentioned considerations taken from the doctrine of issue preclu-
sion. Although courts may indeed perform this balancing in
individual cases, 159 this Note argues first that the policy considerations
for and against the application of judicial estoppel to inconsistent po-
sitions of law applied to fact are such that the doctrine should be
made available to courts in those circuits in which it is currently un-
available. Second, this Note argues that when the inconsistent posi-
tion to be estopped is one of pure law, judicial estoppel will so rarely
be appropriate that the doctrine should not be available at all to
courts in these situations.
A. Judicial Estoppel Should Be Available for Inconsistent
Positions of Law Applied to Fact
Judicial estoppel is appropriate for the general class of positions
of law applied to fact. This section argues that the adoption of contra-
dictory positions of law applied to fact threatens judicial integrity, and
that, in many situations, litigants' behavior in attempting to foist such
contradictory results on the courts rises to the level of culpable con-
duct. Because the facts in the second proceeding must be the same as
in the first, courts need not worry that litigants as a class could not
foresee the second claim and thus lacked incentive to litigate fully.
Also, the court would remain free to use its discretion to refuse to
estop a party. Finally, use of judicial estoppel when the issue is not
purely legal does not cause inequitable administration of the law
among similarly situated litigants, nor does it deprive courts of a
chance to advance the law. Under this analysis, judicial estoppel
should be made available for positions of law applied to fact.
1. Examining the Potential Threat to Judicial Integrity
In order for judicial estoppel to be appropriate for positions of
law applied to fact, there must exist the possibility of harm to judicial
integrity if the court accepts contradictory versions of such a position.
As courts that permit judicial estoppel in this situation have recog-
nized, "the change of position on [a] legal question is every bit as
harmful to the administration of justice as a change on an issue of
159 See Eric A. Schreiber, The Judiciary Says, You Can't Have It Both Ways: Judicial Estop-
pel-A Doctrine Precluding Inconsistent Positions, 30 Loy. L.A. L. RFv. 323, 355 (1996).
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fact."'6 Cases in which a litigant attempted to directly contradict an
earlier accepted legal position 'logically support this conclusion. For
example, the litigant in Warda v. Commissioner sought to avoid paying
taxes by claiming that she held a piece of property in trust when she
had already been declared the titleholder in earlier litigation.1 6 1 Be-
cause the law governing whether Warda held title was the same in
both actions, her positions were clearly contradictory. To allow her to
pursue such a contradictory path, the court stated, "represent[ed] a
'knowing assault on the integrity of the judicial system.'" 1 62
Consider also Lydon v. Boston Sand & Gravel Co., in which an em-
ployee, Lydon, attempted first to bring a claim against his employer,
Boston Sand, through arbitration under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. In this action, Boston Sand successfully argued that the agree-
ment called for claims to be settled in court under state statutes. 163
When Lydon subsequently sued his employer in state court, Boston
Sand removed to federal court by claiming federal law preemption. 164
In applying judicial estoppel, the First Circuit stated:
Boston Sand's inconsistency is both patently unfair to Lydon and
destructive to the integrity of the judicial system .... Not only does
that strategy place Lydon at an unfair disadvantage and force him to
embrace inconsistent arguments, but also it erodes the credibility of
the court system and the efficacy of private arbitration agreements.
If parties are allowed to argue one position to get out of arbitration
and then to argue the exact opposite to avoid related court battles,
the value of arbitrators as decisionmakers (a value that has repeat-
edly been stressed by the Supreme Court, particularly in the context
of labor matters) will be vitiated. 165
Thus, as both the First and Sixth Circuits have expressed, a change in
positions of law applied to fact can be just as harmful to judicial integ-
rity as a change in positions of fact.
However, as discussed in Part III.A, judicial estoppel serves a
greater purpose than preserving judicial integrity merely by prevent-
ing inconsistent results. 16 6 Judicial estoppel is also concerned with the
threat to judicial integrity that arises when litigants are allowed to
knowingly manipulate the courts. 16 7 Again, however, this "evil"'16 of
culpable litigants appears as frequently when litigants seek to contra-
160 In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 1990).
161 See Warda v. Comm'r, 15 F.3d 533, 535 (6th Cir. 1994).
162 Id. at 539 (quoting Reynolds v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 1988)).
163 See Lydon v. Boston Sand & Gravel Co., 175 F.3d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1999).
164 Id. at 9-10.
165 Id. at 13.
166 See supra Part M.A.
167 See id.
168 See In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990).
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dict positions of law applied to fact as when litigants seek to contradict
positions of fact. In Lydon, for example, the court suggested that Bos-
ton Sand had contradicted itself as part of a specific strategy to deny
Lydon relief.16 9 In fact, the type of "cynical gamesmanship"'170 de-
cried by the courts in this field is more likely when the positions are
legal rather than factual. A factual position is limited by what can
actually be proved, whereas legal positions are only marginally limited
by the facts of the situation and the imagination of the lawyers. 171
Consider the case of Wilfong v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., which dealt with
the requirements for class certification in a gender discrimination
suit. 172 Defendant Rent-A-Center had been sued by current and for-
mer female employees in two separate federal courts, the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri and the Southern District of Illinois. Rent-A-Center
settled the claims in Missouri, but in doing so it stipulated that all the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 had been met,
because genuine compliance with this Rule is required even for settle-
ment purposes.173 Yet in the action in Illinois, Rent-A-Center not only
disputed the commonality of the women's claims, it may also have
tried to hide the fact of the stipulation by leaving out any mention of
the Missouri actions in its response to the class certification motion. 174
Because the commonality of claims is determined by a legal test, Rent-
A-Center's position is best described as one of law applied to fact. For
whatever reason, Rent-A-Center decided that its interests were best
served in the Illinois action by fighting class certification, and so it
chose to hide its earlier position. This attempt to increase the chances
that the Illinois district court would render a decision inconsistent
with the settlement brokered in the Missouri district court is precisely
the type of culpable behavior that judicial estoppel seeks to
discourage.
169 See Lydon, 175 F.3d at 13 (stating that "Boston Sand should not be allowed to argue
successfully in each of two potential forums that Lydon's claims should be heard in the
other, thereby depriving Lydon of any tribunal in which to bring his action" because "[n]ot
only does that strategy place Lydon at an unfair disadvantage and force him to embrace
inconsistent arguments, but also it erodes the credibility of the court system . . ." (footnote
omitted)).
170 Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990).
171 See Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J.
1405, 1471-72 (2000); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Inter-
ests, 36 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1303, 1331-40 (1995) (discussing lawyer misrepresentations).
172 No. 00-CV-680-DRH, 2001 WL 1795093 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2001).
173 Id. at *6 n.7.
174 Id. at *1 n.1 ("The Court finds it interesting and significant that in responding to
the motion for class certification, Rent-A-Center did not distinguish this case from ...
[the] class actions filed in the Western District of Missouri, let alone mention the existence
of these cases.").
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2. Examining the Potential for Unfairness to Litigants and Harm to
the Courts
The previous section established that the integrity of the courts
can be harmed both by inconsistent outcomes based on contradictory
positions of law applied to fact and by the intentional gamesmanship
of litigants seeking to impose such contradictions on the courts. The
next question, therefore, is whether the countervailing considerations
drawn from issue preclusion nonetheless weigh against the use ofjudi-
cial estoppel in such situations. These considerations include (1)
whether it is unfair to apply estoppel to a litigant who previously
lacked the incentive to litigate; (2) whether courts will be treating sim-
ilarly situated litigants unequally if estoppel is applied; and (3)
whether the courts themselves will be harmed if they apply estoppel.
First, would the application of judicial estoppel be inappropriate
due to the "inadequacy of the opportunity or incentive to have fully
litigated the issue in the first action?"'175 It is true that differences in
the law between jurisdictions and the ambiguities inherent in any
body of law can decrease the likelihood that two positions of law ap-
plied to fact will directly contradict each other.176 And to the extent
that a litigant cannot know when in the future he will contradict an
earlier position, concerns regarding the incentive to litigate are legiti-
mate. However, because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, the
courts retain discretion to allow contradictions if the future litigation
was truly unforeseen.1 77 In addition, this problem is not unique to
legal positions. Facts alone can be so complicated as to create a fore-
seeability problem. 178 The potential ramifications of any position
taken on law applied to fact are limited by those facts-positions
taken later without regard to the original facts cannot be "clearly
contradictory."' 7 9
Furthermore, lack of foreseeability (and thus incentive to fully
litigate) is generally not a concern for the position of law applied to
fact because the subsequent lawsuit is frequently closely related to the
175 Hazard, supra note 146, at 86.
176 See Maiz v. Virani, ii r.d 33,4, 559 (5th Cir. 2002); see aiso Paper, Alijed-indus.,
Chem. & Energy Workers Int'l Union v. Allied Textile Cos., 235 F. Supp. 2d 8, 21 (D. Me.
2002) ("'Application ofjudicial estoppel to the law elements of prior positions must...
recognize that seeming inconsistencies may be explained by the different legal standards
that may masquerade under similar legal expressions. Positions taken under one body of
law may not be inconsistent with positions taken under [another]."' (quoting 18B CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4477, at 596-97 (2d ed. 2002))).
177 See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001).
178 See id.
179 See, e.g., Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir.
2002) (noting that "[t]he application of a legal rule or standard to the particular facts of
particular cases will yield different outcomes . . . depending on th[ose] facts"); supra Part
I.B.
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first lawsuit. For example, in Reynolds v. Commissioner, the court used
judicial estoppel to bar the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from try-
ing to attribute a capital gain to a husband when the IRS had suc-
ceeded in having his ex-wife claim the gain in her bankruptcy
proceeding. 180 The IRS should certainly foresee that it may later be in
its best interest to pursue the other, wealthier ex-spouse. Therefore, it
cannot be said that lack of incentive to litigate prompted the IRS to
attribute the gain to the ex-wife.
As another example, consider a Ninth Circuit decision in which a
parent company first claimed, in order to avoid mandatory arbitra-
tion, that only its subsidiary could be held as a party to an agree-
ment.181 After a jury returned a verdict of $15 million against the
company for brdach of an oral contract, the company tried to claim
the benefit of the just-repudiated agreement, which precluded oral
contracts.' 82 Because it is almost per se foreseeable that when a liti-
gant disowns an agreement, he must forgo other defenses based on
being party to that agreement, the application of judicial estoppel in
a case like this presents no greater chance of unfairness to a litigant
than would its application for factual contradictions.
The case of Moriarty v. Svec further supports the proposition that
concerns underlying the doctrine of issue preclusion regarding the
incentive to litigate should not prevent the use of judicial estoppel for
positions of law applied to fact. 183 Moriarty, as a representative of a
pension, health, and welfare fund, sued Svec for allegedly delinquent
contributions from two businesses owned by Svec. Because only one
of the two businesses had signed the collective bargaining agreement
that mandated contributions, Moriarty argued for the application of
the "single employer doctrine," and successfully forced both busi-
nesses to contribute. 184 Moriarty then claimed that because Svec
worked as a funeral director in one of the businesses, he owed contri-
butions for his self-employment. When Svec asserted that the single
employer doctrine should govern whether an owner could be consid-
ered an employee, Moriarty claimed it was inapplicable. 8 5 The court
agreed with Svec that because Moriarty had prevailed in his assertion
that the single employer doctrine applied to Svec and his two busi-
nesses, he was estopped from arguing against its subsequent applica-
tion. 186 Although this case presents perhaps the least obvious
example of foreseeable consequences in later litigation, it neverthe-
180 See Reynolds v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 469, 471, 474 (6th Cir. 1988).
181 Humetrix, Inc., v. Gemplus S.C.A., 268 F.3d 910, 914, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2001).
182 See id.
183 See Moriarty v. Svec, 233 F.3d 955, 962-63 (7th Cir. 2000).
184 See id. at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185 Id. at 961-62.
186 Id. at 962.
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less supports the application of judicial estoppel. Moriarty asserted
that a legal doctrine should govern the question of whether Svec's
businesses should pay contributions. It is foreseeable that this doc-
trine should also govern a specific contribution; thus, it cannot be said
that Moriarty had no incentive to argue a different position because
he could not foresee the potential ramifications of his position.
As a class, therefore, inconsistent positions of law applied to fact
do not involve unforeseeable circumstances that would render the ap-
plication of judicial estoppel unfair due to a lack of incentive to liti-
gate. Moreover, when a specific application would present such a
problem, the court can, at its discretion, refuse to apply estoppel.18 7
Thus far, it appears that judicial estoppel is appropriately applied to
these positions of mixed law and fact.
Other policy considerations drawn from issue preclusion do not
change this analysis. Because positions of law applied to fact are not
purely legal, concerns about courts applying the law unequally to simi-
larly situated litigants are misplaced. 1 8 Positions of law applied to fact
are inextricably tied to the unique facts of each case, making it nearly
impossible to treat another litigant differently.18 9 Even those posi-
tions that are closer to questions of pure law on the law/fact contin-
uum do not present a problem. As recognized by the drafters of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments in the section on issue preclusion,
when the subject matter of the two actions is the same and they are
thus closely related, estoppel can be applied safely even though the
issues are close to being issues of pure law.190 Nor does the applica-
tion of judicial estoppel overly deprive a court of the opportunity to
advance the law-the litigants in these situations are not arguing for
changes in the law in general, but changes in how the law is applied to
a particular set of facts. In these circumstances, "'the historical facts
are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the
187 See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001).
188 Cf Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Fed. Energy Regulation Comm'n, 826
F.2d 1074, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing, in the context of issue preclusion, the inap-
propriateness of estopping a party on an issue of pure law because similarly situated liti-
gatni, would br allowed to challenge tile law, thus creating inequity in its administration).
189 See Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. Cen-
tury Motor Freight, Inc., 125 F.3d 526, 532 (7th Cir. 1997).
190 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. b (1982). The Restatement drafters
state:
The distinction between issues of fact and issues of law is often an elusive
one.... When the claims in two separate actions between the same parties
are the same or are closely related-for example, when they involve as-
serted obligations arising out of the same subject matter-it is not ordina-
rily necessary to characterize an issue as one of fact or of law for purposes of
issue preclusion. If the [requirements of issue preclusion have been met],
preclusion will apply.
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issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitu-
tional] standard.'"191
B. Judicial Estoppel Should Not Be Available for Inconsistent
Positions of Pure Law
Because the circuits have largely avoided any detailed discussion
of judicial estoppel for positions of pure law, there are few examples
of the actual application of the doctrine in that context. Nonetheless,
the few existing cases, in addition to hypothetical scenarios drawn
from similar legal fields involving positions of pure law, can be evalu-
ated by reference to the same criterion as positions of law applied to
fact. Although contradictory positions of pure law have the potential
to threaten judicial integrity, the high costs of allowing estoppel can-
not be justified. First, actual contradictions will be rare. And where
contradictions exist, future litigation or the magnitude of future liabil-
ity will likely have been unpredictable because there need not be any
factor in common between two opposite positions of pure law. Fur-
thermore, without the involvement of common facts, a large number
of litigants could bring the same purely legal claim. If estoppel is ap-
plied to only one litigant, courts will be treating similarly situated liti-
gants differently, resulting in an inequitable administration of the law.
Finally, the advancement and resolution of the law itself is slowed by
estoppel of positions of pure law, because the court is deprived of the
opportunity to reconsider the question.
1. Examining the Potential Threat to Judicial Integrity
As with positions of law applied to fact, the first salient question is
whether contradictory positions of pure law can pose the type of
threat to judicial integrity that warrants application of judicial estop-
pel. In 1997, in an unpublished decision, the Fourth Circuit applied
judicial estoppel to the question of the constitutionality of North Car-
olina's scheme for electing superior court judges. 192 The Republican
party had successfully challenged the old statewide scheme of electing
judges, on the basis that unconstitutional political gerrymandering
had deprived Republicans of their equal protection rights. 193 The dis-
trict court imposed a system of election by district pending further
legislation. At the next election, two Republican candidates, Vos-
burgh and Tilghman, lost the election even though they would have
191 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (alterations in original) (quot-
ing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982)).
192 Ragan v. Vosburgh, CA-88-263-5-F, 1997 WVL 168292 at **5-6 (4th Cir. Apr. 10,
1997). The Fourth Circuit has subsequently taken the position that judicial estoppel ap-
plies only to factual positions, and thus this opinion, even if it were reported, would have
little precedential value. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
193 See id.
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won under the traditional statewide system. When the North Carolina
General Assembly enacted legislation confirming the result achieved
under the new district voting system, Vosburgh and Tilghman chal-
lenged the constitutionality of this retroactive application, and
claimed that because the original statewide system was constitutional,
they should be seated as judges.19 4
The Fourth Circuit found judicial estoppel an appropriate means
by which to dismiss the action of the two Republican candidates be-
cause they had affirmatively joined in the effort to have the statewide
electoral system declared unconstitutional. Among other acts, the two
had submitted affidavits stating that, "'the statewide system of electing
Superior Courtjudges has been designed and maintained for the pur-
pose of diluting Republican votes for candidates for the office of Su-
perior Court judge,"' and "'[t]he statewide election system definitely
has the effect of diluting Republican votes for candidates for the of-
fice of Superior CourtJudge. I believe that it has been maintained for
the same reason." ' 195
At first glance, the Vosburgh scenario could be a poster child for
allowing judicial estoppel on positions of pure law. The constitution-
ality of a state system for the election of judges certainly qualifies as
pure law; it involves a "'legal issue[ ] unrelated to the facts of the
case." '"1 9 6 And there is no question that Vosburgh and Tilghman af-
firmatively chose to challenge the original statute; the two even went
so far as to testify before the court that they chose to run only because
the district court had granted preliminary relief changing the election
format.1 97 Their subsequent assertion that this very system was consti-
tutional, and that they had therefore been deprived of their lawful
judgeships, is clearly contradictory. Their change in position reeks of
"blowing hot and cold as the occasion demands,"'198 or "wanting to
'have [their] cake and eat it too."'199 And if this behavior alone did
not threaten judicial integrity, the fact that these two were attempting
to become judges themselves by using these tactics should suffice.
However, such threats to judicial integrity should nevertheless be
rare with regard to purely legal positions. First, as discussed for posi-
tUI of law applic , fa,- the presence of ambilUities in a single
body of law and differences between jurisdictions decreases the
194 Id. at **1-4.
195 Id. at *6.
196 O'Brien v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 443 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b) advisory committee note to 1970 amend.); see supra Part I.B.
197 Ragan, 1997 WL 168292 at *6.
198 Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 n.3 (4th Cir. 1982).
199 Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Duplan Corp. v. Deer-
ing Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1177 (D.S.C. 1974)).
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chance of direct contradiction for legal positions.200 Every body of
law contains ambiguities, great or small.20 1 Moreover, because purely
legal arguments deal almost exclusively with such ambiguities and dif-
ferences, the chance of a direct contradiction is even less.2 0 2 How-
ever, because cases in which contradictory positions of pure law
threaten judicial integrity do exist, rarity alone cannot be dispositive
of the issue.
2. Examining the Potential for Unfairness to Litigants and Harm to
the Courts
Because the Vosburgh court, and courts like it, justify judicial es-
toppel for inconsistent positions of pure law by invoking a need to
protect judicial integrity, the second question is whether the counter-
vailing considerations borrowed from issue preclusion nonetheless
weigh against its application. The first consideration-the unfairness
of estopping a party when she lacked the incentive to litigate fully in
the first action-demands an affirmative answer to this second ques-
tion. As just discussed, ambiguities exist in every body of law to a
greater or lesser extent,203 leaving litigants who espouse positions of
pure law less able to predict whether their future situations might cre-
ate a contradiction. And while privity or mutuality is often present, it
is not required for the application of judicial estoppel.20 4 If a litigant
cannot know to which group of future litigants she will be bound, it is
doubtful that any particular future action will be foreseeable. As dis-
cussed in Part IV.A, for positions of law applied to fact the two actions
will almost always be closely related; otherwise differences in the facts
would prevent a contradiction. By definition, however, a position of
pure law is not tied to any set of facts. 205 These positions therefore
lack any inherent safeguard to ensure that future actions, if not involv-
ing a party meeting the mutuality requirements, nonetheless involve
litigants that are somehow related.
200 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
201 See Ziff, supra note 143, at 923-24 ("[In] almost every area of the law, there is a
strong tension between clarity and flexibility. This results from the inevitable 'gray area'
on the fringes of even the most straightforward area of law.").
202 Cf Havird Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 149 F.3d 283, 292 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding
no contradiction between two purely legal positions regarding whether a parent company
and its wholly owned subsidiary can conduct business with each other).
203 See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
204 See, e.g., Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (l1th Cir. 2002)
("The doctrine of judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial system, not the
litigants; therefore, numerous courts have concluded, and we agree, that '[w]hile privity
and/or detrimental reliance are often present in judicial estoppel cases, they are not re-
quired.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lum-
ber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 1996))).
205 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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As an example, consider a scenario in which company A seeks to
sue out-of-state individual B, and argues that personal jurisdiction
should exist because B had an Internet site. In particular, A argues
that personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process requirements
when "the out-of-state defendant's Internet activity is expressly
targeted at or directed to the forum state. '20 6 If A later obtains its own
Web site, advertising for the company, and a third party, C, then sues
A in a jurisdiction allowing personal jurisdiction up to the limits of
due process, should A be precluded from arguing that satisfying due
process requires more than express targeting?20 7 Although arguing
such a position would be contradictory, A did not seem to have an
incentive in its suit against B to seek another method of satisfying per-
sonaljurisdiction. Because there is no factual connection between the
suits, the second suit was not obviously foreseeable. Nor is C v. A nec-
essarily the end of the story; there could also be D v. A, E v. A, and so
on. If A v. B involved considerably less money than that at stake in C
v. A, a more serious problem arises. As discussed in Part III.B.1, when
significantly more money is at stake in the second action, estoppel
may be unfair due to the lack of incentive to litigate. 208 Because the
future suits against A were not foreseeable, judicial estoppel is doubly
inappropriate.
For those few situations in which a litigant advances a contradic-
tory position of pure law and judicial estoppel is not unfair due to a
lack of incentive to litigate, problems remain. Application of judicial
estoppel to these "unmixed questions of law"209 poses the same con-
cerns that arise when issue preclusion is applied in this context. In
creating an exception for questions of pure law to the doctrine of is-
sue preclusion, courts have identified two main concerns. First, when
a litigant is held to an interpretation of the law that the court would
reconsider for any other person, the courts are not applying the law
equally to similarly situated litigants. 210 Second, the interests of the
judicial system itself are detrimentally affected when a party, but for
06 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262-63 (4htn Cir. 2002). Til Fourth
Circuit ultimately adopted a more stringent test for Internet activity. See id. at 263.
207 Judicial estoppel has been raised in the context of personal jurisdiction. For exam-
ple, in Sandstrom v. Chemlawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83 (1st Cir. 1990), a litigant argued unsuccess-
fully that judicial estoppel should prevent an opponent from contesting personal
jurisdiction. See id. at 87-88.
208 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
209 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162-63 (1979) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1233 (3d
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
210 See, e.g., Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Fed. Energy Regulation Comm'n,
826 F.2d 1074, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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estoppel, could have argued for a change in the law, because the court
is deprived of a chance to advance the law. 2 1'
A court that refuses to reconsider the law for one litigant on es-
toppel grounds but would do so for any other litigant is administering
the law inequitably.212 This principle of equality among litigants has
been widely recognized as vital to the fairness of the courts. 213 When
a litigant has adopted a position of law applied to fact, that litigant is
not estopped from arguing that the law in general should be changed;
rather, the litigant is estopped only from arguing that the law, as ap-
plied to a very particular set of facts, should be changed. 214 There-
fore, there is no danger that the court will treat these litigants
differently than others similarly situated because an identical factual
situation probably does not exist. But when a litigant is estopped from
arguing for or against the constitutionality of a law, or from challeng-
ing a statute or common law doctrine, 21 5 a large number of other po-
tential litigants could bring the identical claim. If a court were to find
a statute unconstitutional for one litigant and thus not require compli-
ance, but force another litigant to obey without question, that second
litigant would be deprived of a right the court would otherwise recog-
nize. "[A]mong '[t] he reasons most commonly advanced [against es-
toppel] ... [is] that it is particularly unjust to preclude reargument of
questions of law that would be open to challenge by other
litigants.' "216
In Ragan v. Vosburgh, discussed earlier as the perfect example of
contradictory positions of pure law threatening judicial integrity, the
retroactive application of a statute that in essence determined the re-
sults of an election after the fact arguably violated the Constitution. 217
211 See Buckley, supra note 156, at 899.
212 See Burlington N. RR Co., 63 F.3d at 1237-38; supra Part III.B.2.
213 See Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987); Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Union (Indep.) Pen-
sion Fund v. Century Motor Freight, Inc., 125 F.3d 526, 532 (7th Cir. 1997). Whether
courts are philosophically justified in considering equality among similarly situated liti-
gants to be of paramount importance is a matter of much dispute and beyond the scope of
this Note. For a sample of the literature, see the dispute between professors Peters and
Greenawalt: Kent Greenawalt, "Prescriptive Equality": Two Steps Forward, 110 HARv L. REv.
1265 (1997); ChristopherJ. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1210 (1997); Chris-
topherJ. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE
L.J. 2031 (1996).
214 See supra Part IV.A.1.
215 See supra Part I.B.
216 Century Motor Freight, 125 F.3d at 532 (alterations in original) (quoting 18 WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 176, § 4416, at 136 (1981 & Supp. 1997)).
217 Ragan v. Vosburgh, No. CA-88-263-5-F, 1997 WrL 168292, at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 10,
1997).
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Had there been a third judge218 who would have been elected under
the old system but was not under the new, and who had not partici-
pated in the original Republican attempt to invalidate the voting sys-
tem, this case would present a situation where estoppel was
inappropriate. If the court found the North Carolina statute uncon-
stitutional in the third judge's case, it would presumably also be un-
constitutional insofar as it deprived Vosburgh and Tilghman of their
seats. And yet, if the court applied judicial estoppel in this situation,
Vosburgh and Tilghman would be required to obey an unconstitu-
tional statute. Certainly, this result is problematic. And it is not only
the parties that are injured; by behaving inequitably, the very integrity
that courts strive so hard to protect by use of judicial estoppel is
impaired.
Finally, the application of judicial estoppel is problematic when
the issue "is 'one of law and treating it as conclusively determined
would inappropriately foreclose opportunities for obtaining reconsid-
eration of the legal rule upon which it was based.'- 219 As described in
the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments for issue preclusion, the concern is
over purely legal issues raised in situations in which estoppel might
force a higher court to accept the lower court's legal analysis, force
the court of one jurisdiction to accept the analysis of another jurisdic-
tion, or impose consistency among lower courts even though the high-
est court has not yet spoken. 220 In general, any court that has not had
the opportunity to consider a legal doctrine may have room for con-
cern. As stated by the Seventh Circuit, "[w] e think estoppel is less
appropriate where a new plaintiff invokes the doctrine to preclude
litigation over a purely legal question, at least where the question is of
general interest and some complexity, [and] has not been decided by
this court."221
As with issue preclusion, judicial estoppel applied in these situa-
tions will inappropriately prevent courts from considering and advanc-
ing the law. Initially, there is a problem when the two fora in question
are in different jurisdictions: it is difficult to take contradictory posi-
tions on an issue of pure law due to differences in the jurisdictions'
crevrnincr lbw qv well ai amhim ities within the same body of law. 2 2 2
218 There actually was a third judge, but he failed to comply with a residency require-
ment and thus could not properly be a candidate. As such, only Vosburgh and Tilghman
could protest. Id. at *5 n.3.
219 Century Motor Freight, 125 F.3d at 531 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDC-
MENTS § 29(7) (1982)).
220 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. i (1982).
221 Century Motor Freight, 125 F.3d at 532; see Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 422
n.10 (7th Cir. 2002).
222 See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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Denying estoppel frees courts in different jurisdictions to develop the
law.
When a litigant does manage to assert two contradictory positions
of pure law, foreclosing consideration of the law is nevertheless inap-
propriate. In Divine v. Commissioner, a case dealing with issue preclu-
sion, the Second Circuit laid out several reasons supporting this
conclusion. 223 The Commissioner had brought actions against stock-
holders in the same corporation in both the Second and Seventh Cir-
cuits for deficiencies in their personal taxes due to the
characterization of certain shareholder distributions as dividends
rather than distributions of capital. The Seventh Circuit reached its
decision first, and the litigants in the Second Circuit attempted to
bind the Commissioner to his position in the Seventh Circuit litiga-
tion regarding whether "a corporation's earnings and profits can[ ] be
reduced by the spread between the fair market value of its stock and
the prices paid for the stock by employees who purchased it by exer-
cising restricted stock options the corporations had granted" for divi-
dend purposes.224 The court refused to apply estoppel on policy
grounds relating specifically to the need to develop the law in this
area.
2 25
Although the Divine court focused on the particular complexity
of tax law, its statements regarding the difference between issues of
pure law and law applied to fact remain relevant even outside the tax
context. The court stated that arguments relating to "differences over
what the governing principles of law mean," and not arguments in
which the law is undisputed and the facts are at issue, precipitate con-
flict between different courts. 226 Only through such conflicts can an
issue be resolved by a higher court, particularly when that must be the
Supreme Court, which often will grant certiorari only upon develop-
ment of a split in authorities. 227 Because estoppel prevents such con-
flicts, it slows the development and resolution of the law, and
therefore is inappropriate. 228 And in the interim, estoppel prevents
the rule within a lower court from developing fully.
The importance of a court deciding legal issues on the merits,
not technicalities, can also be seen in a related area-the question of
whether an appellate court may hear an issue not raised in the lower
court. In general, an appellate court will refuse to hear such issues for
223 See Divine v. Cornm'r, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974).
224 Id. at 1045.
225 See id. at 1043, 1046-49.
226 See id. at 1049.
227 See id.
228 See id.
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the first time on appeal. 229 However, when the issue is one of pure
law, appellate courts may nevertheless hear the issue. 230 Thus, al-
though " [t] he smooth, efficient working of the judicial process de-
pends heavily upon the assumption that [arguments presented by
counsel] will be made after careful, deliberate evaluation by skilled
attorneys who must ultimately accept responsibility for the conse-
quences of their decisions,"231 courts nevertheless will ignore the
harm to an efficient judicial process in order to address the law.23 2
In this context, judicial estoppel functions in the same way as is-
sue preclusion to retard the growth of the law. For example, in Mur-
ray v. Silberstein, the Third Circuit applied judicial estoppel to prevent
Murray, a bail commissioner, from changing his position on whether
the immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment precludes a claim
for lost wages for being discharged by a judge.233 The court was wor-
ried about other legal matters raised in the case that it could not
reach because it decided to dismiss on judicial estoppel, such as First
Amendment concerns stemming from the fact that Murray was dis-
charged due to the political activities of his wife. The court nonethe-
less felt its action was acceptable because the rules regarding bail
commissioners had been made more explicit, and thus the exact prob-
lem would not resurface. 234 However, the court neglected to note the
impact of its failure to decide 235 the Eleventh Amendment issue. As a
result, future litigants attempting to challenge the discharge provi-
sions in the Third Circuit will not know whether they have to claim
irreparable injury because they cannot receive or seek lost wages. In
addition, litigants outside of the Third Circuit may also suffer, because
the Third Circuit's avoidance of deciding the issue on the law slows
the development of either a split sufficient to gain Supreme Court
resolution or a consensus among all circuits. Therefore, the chance
of having a litigant situated to raise the First Amendment challenge
who will lose on the Eleventh Amendment issue is greatly diminished.
Thus, two bodies of important constitutional law suffered from this
decision. The benefit of protecting the court's integrity is thus seri-
ously outweighed by the costs to the advancement of the law in this
situation.
229 See Daikin Miami Overseas, Inc. v. Lee, Schulte, Murphy & Coe, P.A. (In re Daikin
Miami Overseas, Inc.), 868 F.2d 1201, 1207 (11th Cir. 1989).
230 See, e.g., id.; Novack v. Gardner (In re Novack), 639 F.2d 1274, 1276 (5th Cir. 1981).
231 EF Operating Corp. v. Am. Bldgs., 993 F.2d 1046, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993)
232 Cf id. (discussing changes of position between appellate brief and oral argument).
233 See Murray v. Silberstein, 882 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1989); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 90-95 (discussing Murray).
234 Murray, 882 F.2d at 67.
235 Id. at 66 n.5.
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The above discussions detailed a number of reasons to refrain
from applying judicial estoppel to positions of pure law. Given that
judicial estoppel presents so many concerns for positions of pure law,
it is apparent that the doctrine can rarely be used appropriately. But
the question remains, in those few specific situations Where none of
the above problems are present, should the doctrine nonetheless be
available? That is, do even such serious problems justify removing ju-
dicial estoppel from the possible actions a court may take when faced
with contradictory positions of pure law?
Despite the possibility of such a situation in which judicial estop-
pel would be appropriate, courts should still be denied its use. First,
because the doctrine will rarely be appropriate, there is a serious dan-
ger of courts applying it when they should not. For example, in Mur-
ray v. Silberstein, the court apparently applied judicial estoppel because
it felt it had no choice in the matter. The court stated that "troubled
as we are, unless we are prepared to jettison the law of judicial estop-
pel, which we are not and in any event cannot do, we cannot adjudi-
cate this case on the merits."23 6 The fact that the court reached its
result only because it believed that it must either embrace or reject
the doctrine of judicial estoppel justifies making a concrete distinc-
tion between estoppel for positions of pure law and of law applied to
fact. Although purely legal issues will arise in the context of the same
factual situation, and thus avoid many of the problems discussed, an-
other consideration militates against giving courts the option to apply
judicial estoppel for positions of pure law. Because there is no privity
requirement, there can be "no apparent rational distinction" 237 be-
tween applying judicial estoppel for purely legal positions in cases
where the facts are similar and cases where they are wholly dissimi-
lar.238 And with no such rational distinction, there is very little to pre-
vent the next court from extending such a decision slightly, until
judicial estoppel applies in situations where indeed the facts are
wholly dissimilar. 239
Furthermore, removing the ability of the courts to use judicial
estoppel for positions of pure law does not leave the courts defense-
less. In these situations, "the more flexible principle of stare decisis is
sufficient to protect.., the court."240 Using stare decisis rather than a
form of estoppel
236 Id. at 67.
237 Divine v. Comm'r, 500 F.2d 1041, 1050 (2d Cir. 1974).
238 Cf id. (analyzing nonmutual issue preclusion, but reaching the same conclusion).
239 Cf id.
240 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. b (1982) (discussing issue preclu-
sion); see id. § 29 cmt. i ("When any of [the factors militating against preclusion for issues
of pure law] is present, the rule of preclusion should ordinarily be superseded by the less
limiting principle of stare decisis.").
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permit[s] flexibility and growth in the law, [as] ... estoppel should
not "freeze doctrine in areas of the law where responsiveness to
changing patterns of conduct or social mores is critical." Stare deci-
sis . . . is the appropriate mechanism for giving effect to a prior
judgment when the issues are legal, abstract, and unrelated to the
facts of particular cases.2 4 1
Because those few situations in which judicial estoppel would have
been appropriate to protect the court's integrity can be solved
through the use of stare decisis, there is no reason to allow courts to
use judicial estoppel for positions of pure law.
CONCLUSION
Judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in one
legal proceeding that directly contradicts a position the party took in
an earlier proceeding. It does so to protect the integrity of the courts,
not the litigants, by preventing inconsistent decisions and stopping
those parties who would attempt to manipulate the court into making
such decisions. However, even though courts apply this doctrine to
protect themselves, they cannot be blind to judicial estoppel's nega-
tive effects on both litigants and the courts. This Note has focused on
those countervailing considerations tied to whether the inconsistent
positions asserted are not just factual, but are, instead, either law ap-
plied to fact or pure law.
With both types, it is apparent that contradictory positions can
threaten judicial integrity. For inconsistent positions of law applied to
fact, there are generally no negative effects on litigants or the court
other than preventing a party from manipulating the courts to suit the
exigencies of the moment. Therefore, there is no reason to prevent
the use of judicial estoppel for such inconsistent positions. Those cir-
cuits that currently do impose a limitation should permit application
of the doctrine, relying on the discretion of the courts to reject estop-
pel that unfairly disadvantages a litigant. For inconsistent positions of
pure law, however, judicial estoppel will rarely be appropriate. The
costs imposed on litigants and courts alike are high, and are notjusti-
fied by those few cases in which estoppel could be applied without
undue harm. Therefore, judicial estoppel should not be available for
inconsistent positions of pure law.
241 Motomura, supra note 151, at 1018 (discussing issue preclusion) (quoting Montana
v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 163 (1979)).
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